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Introduction
Ohio’s school finance history can be characterized as progressive.
Early state funding for school libraries was apportioned from state
property tax receipts and distributed to local schools on a per-pupil
basis. When equalization funding was invented to help poorer
school systems, Ohio adopted that model of funding. Later, when
policymakers placed greater emphasis on teaching, Ohio distributed
state funds based on teacher units. Throughout the 1990s, Ohio
grappled with the elusive concept of adequacy of school funding.
The new millennium ushered in an era of data collection, evaluation, and assessment.
While the aforementioned educational progressions were evolving, the economy was demonstrating its cyclical nature. Tax receipts
increased during economic expansions, and tax receipts decreased
during economic contractions. Optimism for school funding ensued
during expansions, and demands for increased productivity were
characterized during contractions. Although this pattern of optimism and demand for productivity has been difficult to empirically
address, we can learn much about schooling by studying this tension in political economy.
Superintendents and other school administrators live with
tensions in political economy. The voting public believes school
funding is fixed when the economy expands and new state programs are introduced. Administrators are publicly criticized when,
strained for resources, their schools cannot perform within the “do
more with less” paradigm. This research begins to trace patterns
of political economy in schooling. I emphasize the last economic
recession along with funding for schools to describe challenges for
school administrators. I also emphasize entrepreneurial movements
in schooling to describe competition that public school administrators face. A jaundiced viewpoint asserts that public school funding
suffers entropy while entrepreneurial school funding expands.

Scott Sweetland is Associate Professor in the School of Educational Policy and Leadership at The Ohio State University.
He holds an M.B.A. from St. Bonaventure University and a
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Litigation Background
The most controversial and definitive Ohio school finance reform
judicial decisions began and ended with DeRolph v. State (1997,
2003). Although relevant court decisions occurred before 1997, just
as others will occur afterward, these two-of-five DeRolph decisions
encompassed the spirit, intent, and outcomes of school finance
reform litigation in Ohio.
The 1997 DeRolph decision declared Ohio's school funding
system unconstitutional. Fundamentally, the Ohio constitution was
interpreted to mandate a thorough and efficient system of common
schools throughout the state. After elaborate presentations of evidence by both plaintiffs and defendants, in addition to diverse deliberations among Ohio Supreme Court justices, Ohio's school funding
system failed; that is, the system was found to fail tests of being
thorough and efficient. Underlying this judgmental test of thoroughness and efficiency, the following rationales were expressed:
(1) A "thorough" system is not starved for funds.
(2) An "efficient" system does not lack teachers, buildings,
and equipment (DeRolph v. State, 1997, 741).
The 1997 DeRolph decision furthermore dictated that the state
supreme court would retain jurisdiction over the case's final
resolution. Ohio plaintiffs were supported by this dictation. In
other states, when supreme court justices declared school funding
systems unconstitutional, they did not retain oversight. Lack of judicial oversight was one explanation for why school finance reforms
waned (Walter and Sweetland 2003).
Although three other DeRolph decisions followed the 1997 Ohio
Supreme Court decision, the 2003 DeRolph decision stipulated that
the high court no longer retained jurisdiction over the case's final
resolution and outcomes (Maxwell and Sweetland 2004). For plaintiffs, the good news was that Ohio's school funding system was,
as reiterated by the court, unconstitutional. The bad news was that,
barring judicial oversight, perceived gains in winning an unconstitutional ruling could result in null financial outcomes.
Throughout the same period of time, entrepreneurial activities in
education were supported. For example, a charter school program
was authorized in 1997; that program’s enrollment climbed to approximately 94,000 by 2010, more than 5% of statewide enrollment
(Ohio Department of Education 2010a). The blatant irony was that
entrepreneurial schooling was funded while traditional schooling
was underfunded.
Recessionary Impact
Throughout litigated reforms, the economy was expressing typical ups and downs. Economic expansions made possible greater
amounts of funding for schools. Economic contractions foreclosed
additional funding and threatened already established school funding. The reality was that without substantial increases in state tax
receipts, school finance reform would stall. Table 1 presents major
tax receipts for the state of Ohio, 1997 2003.
As revealed in Table 1, the rate of change in tax collections was
positive and substantial during the first four years of DeRolph decisions. The next three years, however, as the Ohio Supreme Court
was attempting to finalize DeRolph proceedings, the overall rate of
change in tax collections became stagnant. The state simply did not
have additional money to put into the school funding system. This
economic reality should have impacted entrepreneurial activities in
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Table 1
Major Tax Receipts for the State of Ohio, 1997-2003
Tax Receipts by Year (in millions of dollars)
Type of Tax

1997

1998

1999

2000

Income

6,018.5

6,946.2

7,173.8

Sales

5,223.0

5,535.1

Corporate

1,220.3

1,268.7

672.9
13,134.7

Utility
Total
Change (%)

2001

2002

2003

8,084.6

8,119.3

8,157.1

8,256.5

5,827.4

6,214.0

6,237.1

6,435.0

6,701.4

1,150.3

1,029.9

973.0

774.4

808.3

708.0

670.6

675.3

674.3

300.0

255.5

14,458.0

14,822.1

16,003.8

16,003.7

15,666.5

16,021.7

10%

3%

8%

0%

-2%

2%

Source: Ohio Department of Taxation (2003).
education as well as traditional schooling. Nonetheless entrepreneurial activities expanded.
Meanwhile, Ohio law required that public school districts
calculate and report five-year financial projections. The projections
included total revenue and other financing sources, and total expenditure and other financing uses to illustrate the financial position of
each district. The projections were used to forecast potential school
district deficits and to guide the adjustment of spending patterns
as well as the pursuit of additional revenues. The Ohio Department
of Education analyzed five-year forecasts to determine whether a
district was likely to encounter a deficit during a three-year period.
Table 2 presents school district projected deficits, 2002-2004.
The growth in the number of school districts that were projected
to incur deficits was alarming, with 2002 as the year when state tax
collections were most impacted by recession. As revealed in Table
2, the percentage of school districts that were projected to incur
deficit financial positions more than doubled in just two years. The
magnitude of this doubling was immense as well, impacting more
than one in four public school districts in Ohio. Given the historical
pattern of state tax collections, it was more than likely that the affected districts’ administrators would need to ask voters to approve
additional school tax levies. Asking voters for more money was
particularly daunting during a recessionary period. Also, the task

Table 2
School District Projected Deficits, 2002-2004
Number of Districts by Year
Projected Deficits

2002

2003

2004

Deficit in Current Year

9

21

35

Deficit in Second Year

14

27

50

Deficit in Third Year

50

69

78

Total Deficit Forecast
Proportion of All Districts (%)

73

117

163

12%

19%

27%

60%

123%

Cumulative Change Rate (%)

Source: Ohio Department of Education, 2003.
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would be an uphill battle because many citizens had been led to
believe that the school funding system was fixed.
The alternative to raising local tax revenues was for the 27%
of Ohio's school districts that forecasted deficits to cut school
programs and services. This action would have directly countered
stepped-up academic requirements that coincided with the DeRolph
litigation as well as the federal No Child Left Behind Act requirements. Academic gains would have been jeopardized, and new
standards of achievement would have been doomed. Moreover,
if pre-DeRolph patterns of educational investment continued to
hold true, then the school districts that would have been forced
to embark on educational program reductions would have been
those districts most in need of their current, and perhaps expanded,
educational programs.
It is interesting to note that throughout 1997 to 2004, state
foundation funding increased; that is, the nominal foundation
amount increased. Unfortunately, foundation funding in Ohio
suffered technical flaws. The most infamous technical flaw involved the foundation program "charge-off." The charge-off was
the amount of the foundation program that each school district
was responsible for funding locally. Set at 23 mills of the local tax
base, the charge-off facilitated fiscal equalization in that wealthier
school districts ended up being responsible for greater proportions of their foundation funding. This arrangement appeared to
be reasonable until valuation and taxation aspects of the local tax
base were considered. For example, as property valuations increased
statewide, the charge-off calculus at the state level captured 23
mills of the increase. In many instances, however, the local level
of taxation did not capture additional revenue owing to the same
increase in tax base. Property tax limitations prevented some local
tax revenues from increasing automatically when tax base property
valuations increased. Because the state calculus operated as though
local revenues automatically rose, the technical effect was dubbed
"phantom revenue." Many school district administrators complained
that they could only capture this revenue by asking local voters to
approve new school tax levies.
Phantom revenue and other technical flaws in Ohio's school
funding system were associated with lever and pulley effects. Those
effects occurred among the foundation program funding amount,
the foundation program charge-off, and property tax limitation
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Table 3
Hypothetical Illustration of Charge-Off Shift
Base Year per Pupil

Foundation Amount
Charge-Off Millage
Local Property Valuation

Growth Rate

$5,000

Next Year per Pupil

3%

23
$110,000

Change per Pupil

$5,150

$150

23
$116,600

$6,600

Local Tax Burden

$2,530

$2,682

$152

State Funding

$2,470

$2,682

-$2

operands. Yet another systemic flaw involved charge-off shift. This
technical flaw occurred when property valuations increased at a
greater rate than foundation program funding. The net result was a
shift in fiscal burden from state to local tax bases, owing specifically
to the foundation program charge-off. Table 3 presents a hypothetical illustration of charge-off shift.
As revealed by Table 3, charge-off shift occurred when local
property valuations increased by 6% while the foundation amount
increased by 3%. When legislated increases in foundation funding
were modest, the state inadvertently leveraged its commitment to
school funding against the local property tax base. As illustrated
by example, the local property valuation increase ($6,600) was
sufficient to generate the full foundation amount increase ($150) as
well as additional funds that actually replaced a very small amount
of base year state funding (-$2). Charge-off shift increased the local
tax burden by $152; that is, the full amount of the increase in state
foundation program funding for the period as well as a portion of
the state's historical commitment to school funding. School district
administrators once again found themselves fighting an uphill battle.
In summary, traditional schooling was promised relief. That relief
was symbolized by extensive litigation that resulted in a unconstitutional state supreme court ruling that the system of funding schools
in Ohio failed to meet the thorough and efficient clause of the state
constitution. The major problem was that the economy faltered
and state coffers were stretched thin. Associated problems were
technical flaws in the funding formula that were not fixed. School
administrators suffered uncertainty and projected deficits.
Entrepreneurial Schooling
While funding for traditional schooling stalled, entrepreneurial
schooling, i.e., schooling outside traditional public schools, expanded. Such alternatives in Ohio included vouchers, charter schools,
Internet schools, and home schooling.
Vouchers
While adequate funding for traditional schooling was pursued,
the economy turned downward, and the availability of funding
diminished. One might have then expected entrepreneurial schooling to suffer funding reductions as well. The opposite outcome
occurred. Even though there was not enough funding available for
traditional schooling, entrepreneurial schooling expanded. Proponents of vouchers were early beneficiaries of the entrepreneurial
schooling movement. Ohio’s school voucher program, as well as its
development, has been described by Sweetland (2000a; 2002b). The
Ohio voucher program was established in 1995. This program was
one of the contemporary, but early voucher “experiments,” and was
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initially limited to the city of Cleveland. By fiscal year 2000, total
authorized enrollment in the voucher program was 4,000 schoolchildren. The cost to taxpayers was originally $2,250 per pupil,
but later the cost grew to $3,450 (Ohio Department of Education
2010b). The measured cost to the public school district was zero.
The voucher program was named “The Cleveland Scholarship and
Tutoring Grant Program.” By 2009, there were 5,388 students and
39 schools participating in the program (Ohio Department of Education 2009).
Since the advent of the Cleveland voucher program, other
voucher programs were created across Ohio. Litigation ensued and,
together with political persuasion, the expansion of Ohio vouchers
was dampened temporarily. Eventually, however, a new voucher
program was developed. The Educational Choice Scholarship Pilot
Program was established for fiscal year 2007 to accommodate
14,000 schoolchildren. Under this voucher program arrangement,
families from low performing schools statewide were permitted
to apply for vouchers to attend private schools. Eighty-one public
schools were impacted as of August 15th, 2007. The new voucher
amounts were $4,250 for grades K-8 and $5,000 for grades 9-12
(Ohio Department of Education 2006a). As of October 2009, there
were 11,722 students enrolled in the voucher program (Ohio Department of Education 2009). By 2011, the program was still limited
to 14,000 students statewide, and the funding remained the same
(Ohio Department of Education 2010c).
Charter Schools
Charter schools in Ohio were conceptualized as “community
schools.” Funding for community schools consisted of the foundation amount plus other adjustments that were awarded to the
public school district of pupil residence. This funding flowed to the
community schools. The Ohio Department of Education (2006b)
described Ohio’s community schools as public, nonsectarian units
that operated independently from traditional public school districts.
Community schools were authorized in 1997, the same year that
the DeRolph decision was rendered. Fiscal year 1999 marked the initial implementation of Ohio’s community schools program. During
that year, the program had 15 schools that served 2,245 children.
Table 4 presents community schools and enrollment, 1999-2010.
Since inception, the number of community schools has grown to
323 and the number of children served by community schools to
94,269. Growth rates from 2001 through 2006 were phenomenal.
The number of community schools grew at a rate exceeding 36%,
or more than 42 schools per year. Community school enrollment
was growing at an annualized rate that exceeded 43%, or more
than 10,548 students per year. By 2010, growth in the number of
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Table 4
Community Schools and Enrollment, 1999-2010
Fiscal Year

Number of
Community Schools

Growth
(Number)

Growth
(%)

Number of
Children Served

1999

15

2000

48

33

220%

2001

68

20

2002

93

25

2003

133

2004
2005
2006
2007

Growth
(Number)

Growth
(%)

9,032

6,787

302%

42%

16,717

7,685

85%

37%

23,628

6,911

41%

40

43%

33,978

10,350

44%

179

46

35%

46,938

12,960

38%

266

87

49%

62,603

15,665

33%

297

31

12%

72,318

9,715

16%

313

16

5%

77,094

4,776

7%

2008

326

13

4%

82,868

5,774

7%

2009

332

6

2%

88,757

5,889

7%

2010

323

-9

-3%

94,269

5,512

6%

Sources: Jewell (2006); Ohio Alliance for Public Charter Schools (2011); Ohio Department of Education (2010a).
community schools slowed and actually became negative. The
number of children served, however, continued to grow substantially.
Conclusion
While comprehensive public information about entrepreneurial
schooling as well as data required for educated analysis were difficult to obtain, the pattern of policy administration was clear.
Entrepreneurial, private-sector-centered activities such as voucher
programs and charter schools expanded. At least in the case
of charter schools, public funding that once went to traditional
public schools was transferred directly to nontraditional, alternative schools. Meanwhile, growth in school funding resources for
traditional public schools slowed substantially.
The old system was characterized by an inadequate school
foundation program and dilapidated school facilities (Moyers 1996;
Sweetland 2000b). Litigation promulgated remedies to increase
foundation and facilities funding (Sweetland 2002a). Funding in
both categories progressed substantially for roughly five years.
Then, foundation funding stagnated in 2003-2004, and facilities
funding slowed in 2005-2006. A new system emerged, cautiously
maintaining traditional public schools while increasingly encouraging alternatives like vouchers and charter schools. A dual system of
providing government sanctioned schooling was created.
On the surface, these changes seemed positive and progressive. Traditional schooling received the benefit of examination
and improvement. The system of funding public schools officially
adopted a methodology of adequacy that would eventually lead to
resources for adequate student achievement. Entrepreneurial schooling was allowed, and its existence promised to provide new insights
about education, organization, and achievement. The duality of the
system made sense. The dual system did however espouse a major
shortcoming: Lack of funding.

School district administrators were led to believe that their
schools would receive more funding. That funding was provided
for a while but then diminished. Entrepreneurial schooling may not
have initially taken money away from school districts. Inevitably,
though, entrepreneurial schooling would compete with traditional
schooling for funding through the state budgeting process. Perhaps
most overlooked were indirect costs to public school districts, e.g.,
costs associated with school administrators having to explain publicly what entrepreneurial schooling was available in the community.
Moreover, there were direct costs associated with school districts
having to compete with entrepreneurial schooling. In order to compete effectively, should school districts reallocate public funds to
pay for marketing departments, salespeople, and advertising?
The unmeasured costs of entrepreneurial schooling that burdened
traditional schooling were considerable. Many school districts also
incurred direct costs such as transfer payments when children
enrolled in entrepreneurial programs. By and large, these costs were
not recognized, let alone reimbursed. School districts already faced
an uphill battle to fight for funding new regulations and standards.
Entrepreneurial schooling created an additional financial burden
quite possibly canceling out the gains that were made toward
achieving adequacy.
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